The price indexation of Social Security bene…t payments has emerged in recent years as a ‡ashpoint of debate in the United States. I characterize the direct e¤ects that changes in that price index would have on retirees who di¤er in their initial wealth at retirement and mortality rates after retirement. I propose a simple but ‡exible theoretical framework that converts bene…ts reform …rst into changes to retirees' consumption paths and then into a net e¤ect on social welfare. I calibrate that framework using recently-produced data on Social Security bene…ciaries by lifetime income decile and both existing and new survey evidence on the normative priorities Americans have for Social Security. The results suggest that the value retirees place on protection against longevity risk is an important caveat to the widespread enthusiasm for a switch to a slower-growing price index such as the chained CPI-U.
Introduction
The indexation of Social Security bene…t payments may seem like an issue about which only an economist could get excited, but it has emerged in recent years as a ‡ashpoint of debate in the United States. In his 2014 budget, President Obama proposed changing the price index with which retiree bene…ts are adjusted for in ‡ation. In brief, the change was expected to lower the growth rate of bene…ts for all retirees, though at advanced ages that change would have been o¤set by progressive "bene…t enhancements." Because it was not tied to an increase in the starting level of those bene…ts, the President's proposal was expected to reduce the total present value of bene…ts. The President's proposal was explicitly intended to appeal to Congressional Republicans eager to reduce future spending on Social Security, but it was deeply unpopular with many of his fellow Democrats 1 . When negotiations on more general …scal policy challenges yielded little progress over the subsequent year, the President removed the proposal from his 2015 budget. His spokesperson This paper was prepared for the Fall 2014 BPEA conference. Thanks to the editors, David Romer and Justin Wolfers, as well as to my discussants, Martin Feldstein and Aleh Tsyvinski, and the many participants in that conference for helpful comments and discussions. Thanks to Darren A. Rippy at the BLS for sharing the data on CPI-E. The author can be contacted at 277 Morgan Hall, Harvard Business School; mweinzierl@hbs.edu. 1 The indexing change was intended to cover tax brackets, as well, and the President's proposal was thereby intended to be a net positive contributor to the government budget. made clear, however, that changes to indexation were still on the table if included in broader budget deals.
While the overall …scal implications of bene…ts-indexing reform have been widely discussed, this paper's contribution is to explore both the positive and normative aspects of its distributional consequences across the population of retirees. 2 In particular, I study the direct e¤ects that changes in bene…ts-indexing have on retirees who di¤er in two important ways: initial wealth at retirement and mortality rates after retirement. I propose a simple but ‡exible theoretical framework that converts bene…ts reform …rst into changes to retirees'consumption paths and then into a net e¤ect on social welfare. I use recently-produced data on the net worth, bene…t levels, and mortality risks of Social Security bene…ciaries by lifetime income decile to provide quantitative results. Finally, I introduce survey evidence on the priorities Americans have for Social Security, a …rst step in pinning down the normative implications of these e¤ects of indexing reform. The speci…c questions I use in the survey take a novel form that may be useful for estimating normative preferences across a wide range of policy issues.
In brief, I …nd that a useful metaphor for thinking about the direct e¤ects of indexation on heterogeneous retirees is a playground seesaw, where two facts about retired households in the United States push down on opposite ends.
Pushing down on the left end of the seesaw (i.e., toward an increasing path of real bene…ts) is the large majority of Social Security bene…ciaries who worry about outliving their private assets and having to rely nearly exclusively on those bene…ts to fund expenditure late in life. In fact, a core purpose-and achievement-of Social Security is to prevent the elderly from falling into poverty as they age (see Gary V. Englehardt and Jonathan Gruber, 2004) . As has long been understood, for instance in Feldstein (1987) , bene…ts that rise in real terms over retirement and are therefore backloaded later in life will provide valuable protection against longevity risk for retirees with positive private wealth (throughout this paper, I assume that private annuitization of wealth outside of DB pensions is unavailable). A faster-growing price index will therefore generate welfare gains through its e¤ects on these households.
Pushing down on the other end of the metaphorical seesaw (i.e, toward a decreasing path of real bene…ts) sit the poorest retiree households, who also have the highest mortality rates (see James E. Duggan, Robert Gillingham, and John S. Greenlees, 2006) . Most directly, the poorest retirees sit on this end because, with little wealth at the start of retirement, they bene…t less from Social Security's e¤ective annuitization. A more subtle reason is that a faster-growing price index that backloads the present value of bene…ts has the e¤ect of redistributing, through an actuarially unfair adjustment, some of the total value of bene…ts away from poorer retirees when mortality is inversely related to income. To the extent that these retirees are the ones who most need support from Social Security, a faster-growing price index thereby generates welfare losses.
In other words, heterogeneity across retiree households means that any given reform to bene…ts-indexing generates e¤ects with exactly opposite welfare implications. In this way, bene…ts-indexing policy inevitably has distributional consequences and, as we will see when considering the proposal by President Obama, may even be used to pursue distributional goals.
It is important to emphasize from the start that this paper focuses on the direct e¤ects of bene…ts-indexing reform on retirees, abstracting from a number of general equilibrium e¤ects and other factors that matter for the optimal path of bene…ts and that, therefore, ought to be part of a comprehensive evaluation of indexing reform. 3 Most prominently, changing the path of bene…ts may a¤ect individuals'labor e¤ort and saving decisions during their working lives, but my calculations hold …xed households'behavior prior to retirement. Related, I do not consider the implications of bene…ts-indexing reform for the accumulation of the economy's capital stock, and I abstract from the controversial possibility that bene…ts paid earlier will yield gains to households who can achieve a higher rate of return in the private investment market than they obtain from the natural rate of return of a pay-as-you-go Social Security system (see Feldstein 1987 Feldstein , 1990 ). Finally, technological change, especially in the context of medical care for the elderly, may a¤ect the optimal response of policy to an increase in real bene…ts and therefore matter for the choice of indexing. 4 This paper's omission of these factors is not meant to imply that they can be ignored. Instead, I omit them to better focus on one piece of that broader question. This paper also abstracts from several complications speci…c to the Social Security system that may matter for the results but that would make the analysis and intuition for the results substantially less straightforward. In particular, I do not model spouses' joint decisions about bene…ts or surviving spouses' decisions about bene…ts options, instead treating the household as the unit of analysis; I do not allow for early or late retirement, instead having all households retire at the same age; and I do not include the disability bene…ts portion of Social Security in the analysis. Microsimulation models that capture much of the complexity of the actual Social Security system, for instance the MINT model as described in Smith and Favreault (2013) , may be useful for including these features in future analyses.
Which side of the seesaw carries more weight? I show that the answer depends on both positive factors about which we have some good existing evidence and normative factors about which we have very little. For the positive factors, I show that a large majority of retirees are likely to sit on the left end of the seesaw, that is, favor a steeper path of bene…ts that e¤ectively annuitizes more of a given retiree's total wealth. Moreover, the simulations below suggest that the gains to the poor from frontloading bene…ts are much smaller, in consumption or individual utility terms, than 3 In principle, as suggested to me by Martin Feldstein, the design of the optimal path of bene…ts and the identi…cation of an ideal price index are separate tasks. If we believe the path of real bene…ts has been chosen optimally in current policy, such a separation is natural. In this paper, I explore the question of how proposed price indexes a¤ect the path of real bene…ts and, therefore, retirees and social welfare. 4 Suppose that advances in medical care for the elderly allowed them to purchase a higher quality of life at a lower real cost, such as through the introduction of a new product. Their real bene…ts would rise in this case, but so too would their ability to generate extra welfare with additional resources. In that case, it may be important to target bene…ts toward households with high marginal utilities of consumption, not low values of real bene…ts. the gains to the majority of retirees from backloading bene…ts. These positive results suggest that the direct e¤ects on retirees of frontloading bene…ts, as in a switch to the chained CPI, are likely to generate a net loss of welfare unless society puts a strong normative priority on the poorest, shortest-lived retirees relative to the rest of the population and, in particular, relative to poor and middle-class retirees who outlive their life expectancy at retirement. In other words, the results of this paper suggest that the value retirees place on protection against longevity risk is an important caveat to the widespread enthusiasm for a switch to a slower-growing price index such as the chained CPI-U.
To explore the normative aspects of this question, I consider two classic normative criteria and generate novel opinion survey evidence on the relevant preferences of Americans. The two classic criteria would endorse opposite reform proposals as simulated here: that is, the utilitarian criterion would endorse backloading while the Rawlsian would endorse frontloading. Survey respondents put equal value on increasing bene…ts to poor retirees who die young and poor retirees who outlive their life expectancies, and they put substantially less value-perhaps even negligible value-on increasing the bene…ts of average retirees. These results are inconsistent with either a utilitarian or Rawlsian criterion on its own, but applying them to the simulated reform results suggests that backloading of bene…ts is likely to generate net welfare gains, at least in terms of its direct e¤ects on retirees, as is the case under the standard utilitarian criterion.
From a policymaking perspective, the net positive welfare implications of the direct e¤ects on retirees of moving to a faster-growing price index might be expected to translate into political support for such a reform, but two political realities make that support less likely: namely, public opposition to bene…t reductions, and pressure from some policymakers to lower total Social Security spending. 5 To see why, note that such a reform automatically means a decrease in initial bene…ts for retirees (if total spending is held …xed) or an increase in total spending (if initial bene…ts are held …xed). Taking those political realities into account, the results of this paper shed some light on the speci…c reform President Obama proposed in his 2014 budget. That proposal, which was designed to reduce total spending by maintaining initial bene…t levels but slowing their growth rate, used "bene…t enhancements" at advanced ages to protect some of the e¤ective annuitization that frontloading would otherwise have sacri…ced. As I show below, the progressive design of those bene…t enhancements meant that they would provide this protection largely to lower-income households. The President's proposed reform would thus simultaneously achieve the positive e¤ects of frontloading on the poorest, shortest-lived retirees and the positive e¤ects of backloading on the poorest, longest-lived retirees, and it would bring a substantial net welfare gain under the utilitarian, Rawlsian, or survey-based normative criterion. 6 Of course, that reform would generate losses as well, reducing the well-being of the higher-income half of the retiree population and-therefore-potentially having disincentive e¤ects that would reduce its appeal in a more 5 Of course, the indirect e¤ects of reform not included in this paper's analysis, such as the e¤ects on private saving and capital accumulation, may also explain resistance to reform. 6 Note that the frontloaded element of the proposal adds to its appeal under the Rawlsian criterion, but not under the utilitarian or survey-based criteria. comprehensive analysis. The President's proposal thus illustrates the inherent connection between bene…ts-indexing policy and the redistributional role of Social Security.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 reviews how Social Security uses indexing today, lays out the seesaw metaphor described above, and brie ‡y summarizes the empirical literature behind the factors at each end. Section 2 presents a simple model that allows us to analyze these direct e¤ects on retiree households with a small set of positive and normative parameters. Section 3 simulates a version of that model using U.S. data, and it considers three prominent indexing reform proposals: the chained CPI-U, the CPI-E (an experimental series calculated by the BLS "using households whose reference person or spouse is 62 years of age or older"), and the chained CPI-U augmented with late-in-life "bene…t enhancements" as proposed by President Obama in 2014. Section 4 presents novel, but far from de…nitive, opinion survey evidence on the normative components of the model and uses that evidence as well as conventional normative criteria to provide suggestive welfare evaluations of the direct e¤ects of the three policy options. Section 5 extends the analysis to include several aspects omitted from the baseline case, and Section 6 concludes.
Background and Key Considerations
The current Social Security system uses indexing-that is, adjusting nominal values over time-in three ways. First, it scales the income earned during a bene…ciary's working years into current dollars when calculating the value at retirement of his total accumulated Social Security earnings.
Second, it indexes the bracket points of the progressive function that converts that scaled lifetime earnings into a monthly bene…t. Third, it indexes bene…ts upon retirement. For the …rst two instances of indexing, the current system uses a wage index; for the third it uses the CPI-W, the consumer price index for urban wage earners.
These three instances of indexing can be seen as serving di¤erent purposes. The …rst, which I will call earnings-indexing, is most naturally seen as trying to capture the natural rate of return of the pay-as-you-go (or "unfunded") Social Security system, which is closely related to the growth rate of nominal wages. 7 The second, which I will call brackets-indexing, tries to preserve the desired progressivity (across lifetime earnings levels) of the system despite changes in the wage distribution and nominal wages. The third, which I will call bene…ts-indexing, tries to protect the real value of retirees'bene…ts over time, though as emphasized throughout this paper it also has implications for the e¤ective progressivity of the system due to di¤erences in mortality by lifetime income levels. It is bene…ts-indexing that has been the focus of public debate, and it will be my focus in this paper 7 Earnings-indexing could, in principle, serve many purposes. Because the lifecycle path of earnings varies systematically with the value of lifetime earnings, the choice of indexing will tend to favor some earners over others. One could try to use that choice, therefore, as a new optimal tax instrument that would relax the classic e¢ ciencyequality tradeo¤. Similarly, one might try to take advantage of the e¤ect that expected earnings-indexing has on the extent to which workers view the payroll tax as a tax, rather than as a form of saving. These are purposes that can be more directly pursued by adjusting the history-dependent redistributive elements of Social Security, such as the replacement rates in each income bracket. as well. 8 
Budget-neutral bene…ts-indexing
This paper's baseline analysis focuses on budget-neutral bene…ts-indexing reforms. By "budgetneutral" I mean that the expected present value of bene…ts (across all individuals in an age cohort) is una¤ected by the way in which bene…ts are indexed. Therefore, in the analysis below in which I consider a shift to an index that causes a steeper rise in bene…ts over time, I adjust (down) the starting value of bene…ts for all bene…ciaries in the cohort by the factor required to keep the expected present value of total bene…ts the same. The assumption of budget neutrality is not necessary, but it allows us to focus on the direct e¤ects of the time path of bene…ts rather than their level. As I show in Section 5, reforms that are not budget neutral can be analyzed using this paper's approach as well, and the main lessons are una¤ected.
A simple but useful observation about changes to budget-neutral bene…ts-indexing is that their e¤ects on bene…t levels are highly concentrated toward the beginning and end of retirement, as illustrated in the following …gure. 8 There appears to be little interest in reform to the other two uses of indexing. Even the Bowles-Simpson proposal (White House 2010), which suggests changing the bracket points to increase progressivity, does not change the methods of earnings-indexing or brackets-indexing. This is somewhat unfortunate, in that changes to the method of earnings-indexing hold substantial promise for more closely aligning the current system with its true "natural" rate of return. In particular, earnings-indexing could include changes to projected bene…ciary-worker (dependency) ratios and aggregate life expectancies. Bracket-indexing would be a simple way of implementing a limited version of the inequality adjustments suggested by, for example, Robert Shiller (2003) . show that alternatives to this assumption do not change the lessons of the baseline analysis). As alternatives to a constant real bene…t, I consider two paths : a "Frontloaded" path in which real bene…ts grow at an annual rate of -0.27 percentage points, and a "Backloaded" path in which they grow at +0.37 percentage points. These alternatives correspond to two prominent proposals for bene…ts-indexing reform: namely the use of the chained CPI-U and the CPI-E indexes calculated by the BLS. Using average mortality rates from the Social Security Administration and an annual discount factor of 0.96, I adjust initial bene…ts under these two alternatives to ensure that the expected present value total cost of each path is the same as for the Status Quo. and late in retirement across bene…t paths. Retirees who value Social Security's insurance against longevity risk, and especially those who come to rely on Social Security bene…ts because they outlive their private savings, will prefer the backloaded bene…ts path. Retirees with little private wealth or high mortality risks, and especially those who do not survive to advanced ages, will prefer the frontloaded path. I now turn to a brief discussion of the existing literature on these two competing features in the retired population in the United States. adequately to sustain desired consumption paths. While doing so, they …nd that Social Security wealth dominates for at least the bottom lifetime-income decile, arguably the bottom three deciles, of retirees. 9 As discussed below, I will rely on these authors'research for estimates of retiree wealth and Social Security bene…ts by income group.
Evidence on variation in private retirement savings

Evidence on the relation between income and mortality
It has become a staple of commentary on the …scal health of Social Security that mortality differences across income groups matter for the true impact of a range of proposed reforms, such as to the full retirement age (see Paul Krugman 2012, for example). While the literature quantifying these mortality di¤erences is less developed than that on wealth, I draw heavily on a few relatively recent contributions.
Gopi Shah Goda, John B. Shoven, and Sita Nataraj Slavov (2009) use mortality estimates for the top and bottom halves of the earnings distribution to show the dramatic result that "Under the assumption of constant mortality across lifetime income subgroups, the Social Security system is progressive regardless of the measure shown. However, a good deal of the progressivity is undone or even reversed when di¤erential mortality is taken into account. The results are similar for both stylized earners at di¤erent points of the earnings distribution and actual workers'earnings histories." They also o¤er this speculation: "Rather than analyzing the mortality di¤erences between those in the top and bottom halves of the lifetime earnings distributions, we would have liked to have the information by lifetime income decile so that we could examine the mortality experience of the genuinely poor vs. those at other parts of the distribution. It seems likely that the extent of mortality inequality is even greater than re ‡ected in the top half/bottom half analysis." In fact, it appears that variation in mortality does widen at the extremes of the income distribution. 
A Partial Reform approach to optimal bene…ts-indexing
In this section I lay out a simple formal structure through which to model how bene…ts-indexing reforms turn into changes in the consumption paths of retirees and how these consumption changes can be aggregated into a measure of social welfare. 10 As noted in the Introduction, this analysis focuses on the direct e¤ects of bene…ts-indexing reform on retirees in the context of heterogeneity in initial wealth and mortality risks, setting aside a number of other factors that matter for a more general approach to the topic of optimal bene…ts-indexing. In particular, I abstract from any distortionary e¤ects that changes to the method of Social Security bene…ts-indexing may have on labor supply or saving decisions of households during their working lives.
In the model, there are I types of Social Security bene…ciaries, indexed by i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig and equally prevalent at the time of retirement, t = 1. Type indicates the level of lifetime income y i , the level of non-annuitized wealth A i;1 available at t = 1, and age-speci…c mortality risks m i;t .
A more general model would not impose a one-to-one link between net wealth, mortality risk, and lifetime income, but the theoretical and (especially) empirical challenges to the analysis are substantially reduced with this assumption. The probability of individual i being alive at age t is Y t
=1
(1 m i; ). As the use of private annuities in the United States is quite limited (see Brown et al, 2001), I assume annuitization of A i is unavailable or unappealingly costly.
Once reaching retirement, each bene…ciary receives streams of real-valued Social Security bene…ts denoted fB i;t g i;t and (possibly zero) DB pension bene…ts denoted fP i;t g for type i at age t (note that all quantities in this paper's analysis are real, not nominal, unless otherwise noted). In the Status Quo policy, we will assume that this stream is constant in real terms, so that B SQ i;s = B SQ i;t for all ages s; t. A reform to the method of bene…ts-indexing generates a stream of changes in bene…ts that I will denote fdB i;t g i;t . Note that I treat B i;t as an after-tax bene…t, implicitly assuming that reform to bene…ts-indexing does not change the tax rates on retiree bene…ts.
Though in principle a reform could take a wide range of forms, in this paper we are especially interested in one class:
t for t 2 f1; 2; :::; T g ;
such that:
where is the uniform discount factor in the economy (I consider heterogeneity in in Section 5).
This class of reforms scales the initial bene…t level by the factor 0 and grows that scaled bene…t by the rate each year, such that the total present value cost of bene…t payments is the same in the Status Quo and reform policies. For example, a reform that increased the initial bene…t level and then reduced the rate of growth in real bene…ts would have > 1 and < 0:
Individuals solve a standard utility-maximization problem once they reach retirement. They use their accumulated assets and their streams of Social Security and DB pension bene…ts to fund consumption in each period they are alive, and they obtain time-separable utility from that consumption. Note that there is no uncertainty in the utility they obtain from spending in the future. 11 Utility is zero when not alive, and there is no bequest motive (in Section 5 I show the results are robust to adding a bequest motive). They are subject to the (real-world) constraint that they cannot borrow against future Social Security or DB pension bene…ts. Formally, individual i solves:
subject to a constraint that (non-Social Security) net worth must be non-negative at all points during retirement:
A i;t 0, for all t 2 f1; 2; :::; T g ;
where A i;1 is given and
where (1 + r) = 1 is the annual return (net of taxes) that an individual may earn on net wealth.
Note that in this model, were households able to fully annuitize their wealth, they would choose a constant consumption level throughout retirement. Without such full annuitization, mortality risk will cause the household's optimal consumption path to decline throughout retirement until reaching the level of annuity bene…ts (provided by Social Security and DB pensions, if applicable).
After that point, the household will be dependent on these bene…ts to fund consumption.
The expected change in social welfare from reform fdB i;t g i;t is evaluated as the weighted sum of the welfare values of the consumption changes it causes. In particular, social welfare is denoted W , so the change in social welfare from the stream of changes in bene…ts fdB i;t g i;t is:
where t dc i;t = fdB i;t g i;t denotes the present value of the change in consumption by type i in year t in response to the change in policy, and g i;t is the marginal social welfare value of a present value unit of consumption for a bene…ciary of type i in year t.
It is important to note that these g i;t parameters can take essentially any values, though Pareto e¢ ciency would require them to be nonnegative. This ‡exibility enables us to use a wide variety of welfare criteria, including those inferred from public opinion, to evaluate policy reforms. An alternative formal approach would locate the welfare costs from the low lifetime utility of the shortest-lived, poorest retirees in their own utility functions, perhaps by having their utility be a highly concave function of total consumption in retirement or some other version of time non-separability. 12 Then, helping those retirees would be a matter of insurance, not redistribution (this logic is related to the justi…cation Rawls o¤ers for the maximin priority). It is far from clear that individuals have such preferences, however, so I take the approach that granting large weights to those worst-case outcomes is a normative decision by society, not a feature of individual preferences.
Simulated e¤ects of bene…ts-indexing reform proposals
To simulate the e¤ects of bene…ts-indexing reform, we need to specify functional forms and parameter values for the preceding section's model, determine the values of the model's key empirical inputs, and choose candidate reform policies.
Functional forms and parameter values
The per-period utility function takes the familiar constant relative risk aversion form:
where = 3 following SSK. 13 I follow SSK in setting the annual discount factor = 0:96 as well, and I assume that the return to saving (1 + r) = 1 :
Data on initial wealth, bene…t levels, and mortality
To determine the key empirical inputs to the model, I use estimates drawn from the existing literature on Social Security. I divide the population of retiree households into deciles by lifetime income, so I = 10 and each type i=f1; 2; :::; 10g corresponds to a lifetime income decile. The use of ten types is made possible by recent empirical work estimating household wealth, bene…ts, and mortality data at that level of disaggregation. Some of that data is not available by gender, so I treat households as the unit of analysis throughout.
For the initial wealth and bene…t levels of retirees I rely on SSK, which is a careful and uniquely detailed source of these data, in that no other source of which I am aware provides both median overall (non-Social Security) net worth and median (present value) Social Security and DB pension wealth data by lifetime income decile. This level of detail is especially important for capturing the right end of the seesaw: for example, data that divides the population into quintiles, or that groups households by point-in-time income rather than lifetime income, can obscure the di¢ cult position in which the lowest decile of retirees appear to …nd themselves. To infer annual bene…t amounts for both Social Security and DB pensions, I use average mortality rates (for men) in the 1 2 I thank Bob Hall for suggesting this discussion. 1 3 This value for is toward the upper end of typical ranges for this parameter, which measures the degree of riskaversion of the individual. Though a high value for may be appropriate if retirees are generally more risk-averse than the average person, I have also run the analysis assuming = 1:5. All qualitative results described in the baseline case hold there as well, though the size of the welfare gains generated by the Hybrid Progressive Reform are smaller. Intuitively, with less concave utility from consumption that policy's redistribution is less valuable in terms of social welfare.
United States and the same real interest rate r as in SSK to calculate the constant real bene…t amounts that yields SSK's reported wealth …gures by lifetime earnings decile (in their Table 2 ). Of course, SSK's data are not perfectly designed for my purposes. Most obviously, the average age of their sample is 55.7 years, several years prior to typical retirement age. Ideally, we would have data at age 62 or 65. While it is possible that the last few years prior to retirement di¤erentially a¤ect retiree households by income decile, a comparison of the SSK data with calculations by Love, Palumbo, and Smith for (point-in-time) income quintiles suggests that this is not likely to be a serious concern. A di¤erent concern is that the SSK data are relatively old, focused on the 1992 HRS wave. Gale, Scholz, and Seshadri (2009) attempt to address this concern and show that their core …ndings are largely una¤ected by considering later cohorts (though they do not reproduce the estimates needed for this paper for later waves). Finally, recent work on the progressivity of the overall OASDI program has noted that, in the words of CBO (2006), "the progressivity of Social Security is driven mainly by disabled-worker and auxiliary [survivor] bene…ts.". While this paper focuses on the retirement portion of bene…ts, for which SSK's estimates are well-suited, we may be interested in the implications of indexing reform that applies to disability bene…ts as well. (Note that SSK implicitly includes disability bene…ts after retirement age has been reached, as disability bene…ts are automatically converted to retirement bene…ts at that point). Table 1 shows the median (non-Social Security) net worth A i , annualized DB pension bene…t The calculated mortality rates in Table 2 show the dramatic negative relationship between lifetime earnings and mortality rates, especially early in retirement. These rates roughly match existing related estimates along a number of dimensions. For example, shown at the bottom of Table 2 are the Social Security Administration's o¢ cial average mortality rates for each gender at each age; these rates match the calculated values for the sixth decile in all cases.
Income program of the United States.
Reform proposals
I consider three reform proposals, two informed by recent experience with chained CPI-U and the experimental CPI-E series and a third based on President Obama's proposal that is a hybrid of the …rst two. The …gure makes clear that chained-CPI-U has risen more slowly than CPI-W over the [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] period, though year-to-year changes are not always smaller. By the end of the fourteen available years, chained CPI-U is approximately 4 percent lower than CPI-W, for an average annual gap of 0:27 percentage points. 15 Over the same period, CPI-E has been nearly identical to CPI-W.
That stands in stark contrast to its more rapid growth from 1983 through 2000, when it exceeded CPI-W by an average annual rate of 0:37 percentage points.
The …rst reform policy-"Backloaded Reform"-is designed to mimic the CPI-E's behavior in the 1983-2000 era, having bene…ts grow at a faster rate than the Status Quo. Speci…cally, I set = 0:0037 for Backloaded Reform, implying a steeper path of bene…ts and a smaller initial bene…t than in the Status Quo.
The second reform policy-"Frontloaded Reform"-is designed to mimic the chained CPI-U's be- 1 5 Thanks to Alan Viard for noting an error in my calculation of this value for in an earlier draft of the paper.
havior since its origination, having bene…ts grow at a slower rate than the Status Quo. Speci…cally, The third reform policy-"Hybrid Progressive Reform"-is designed to match the proposal made by President Obama. In that proposal, the chained CPI-U would be used to index bene…ts, but socalled "bene…t enhancements" would phase in at age 75 and 95, each eventually raising bene…ts by …ve percent of the average retiree's bene…t over a ten-year phase-in period. This reform combines features of the two others, but it also includes a substantial increase in the progressivity of Social Security bene…ts. The source of this increase is the use of the average retiree's bene…t, rather than each individual retiree's bene…t, in the calculation of the bene…t enhancement. As the average bene…t is approximately four times greater than the lowest-decile's bene…t and half as large as the top decile's (see Table 2 ), the …rst ten-year bene…t enhancement would e¤ectively raise bene…ts by 20 percent for the lowest decile retiree and 2.5 percent for the highest decile retiree. The President's proposal thereby illustrates how the debate over indexing is closely linked to the broader debate over progressivity. Related, note that this proposal's redistributive impacts make it more likely to a¤ect labor supply during households'working lives-e¤ects from which this paper abstracts throughout (see Je¤rey B. Liebman, Erzo F.P. Luttmer, and David G. Seif, 2009 for evidence on how labor supply responds to Social Security bene…ts changes). Table 3 summarizes these proposals and shows the equilibrium value of that satis…es the government budget constraint when we simulate the economy's response to each policy. Technically, to obtain these values we set for each reform policy and have the simulation guess a value for . All individuals maximize their utilities given these parameters and the data on bene…ts, net wealth, and mortality. The simulation searches for a value of that satis…es the government's budget constraint as shown in (2) : Note how the Hybrid Progressive Reform leaves the starting value of bene…ts closest to, and above, the Status Quo value, a feature that may be relevant for political feasibility.
Simulated e¤ects of reform
Now we turn to the e¤ects of these reform policies.
I begin by showing the policies'e¤ects on real bene…t payments in Figure 3 . The four subplots of Figure 3 show results for the lowest and second-lowest income deciles, the …fth income decile, and the top income decile. In each subplot, I show the bene…t paths under the Status Quo and three reform policies at each age. The subplots in Figure 3 for the Frontloaded Reform (dotted lines) and Backloaded Reform (dashed lines) closely resemble Figure 1 , of course. In fact, because we apply the same ; pair to all bene…ts paths in each reform, the …gure shows that the e¤ects of reform are quite similar across income deciles. It is also apparent how the Hybrid Progressive Reform (dash-dotted lines) takes on a zigzag shape that combines the two other reforms-providing higher bene…ts at the start of retirement than the backloaded reform and higher bene…ts at the end of retirement than frontloaded reform. In fact, compared to the Status Quo (solid lines) policy, it achieves both higher initial bene…ts and higher …nal bene…ts for low income retirees, re ‡ecting its substantial redistribution of bene…ts from higher to lower deciles.
The e¤ects on consumption paths chosen by retirees in the model are much more variable across income deciles. In the next …gure, we plot consumption under the Status Quo and these reforms following the same structure as above: For these two "simple" reforms, two prominent features jump out from Figure 4 . First, while a household's chosen paths of consumption are hardly distinguishable across bene…ts-indexing meth-ods early in retirement, there are sharp divergences when they exhaust their non-Social Security wealth. Remarkably, all deciles experience a substantially higher median path of consumption in these later years under the Backloaded Reform than under the Frontloaded Reform, despite the latter's inability to generate substantial increases in consumption earlier in retirement. Second, the ages at which households exhaust their private assets and become dependent on Social Security bene…ts rise substantially with lifetime income.
One potentially puzzling nuance related to the …rst of these features is that for all but the bottom decile consumption is in fact slightly greater at all ages under the Backloaded reform than under the Frontloaded reform. The key intuition for this result is that the Frontloaded Reform provides less insurance against longevity risk than the Backloaded Reform. Therefore, households choose to consume less of their private assets in order to self-insure against longevity risk, o¤setting the mechanical increase in bene…ts at early ages that the Frontloaded Reform provides.
For the lowest decile households, however, consumption is greater at early ages under the Frontloaded Reform than under the Backloaded Reform. Two factors explain this exception. First, these households have little wealth and high mortality rates. Thus, the e¤ective annuitization provided by the backloaded path enables only small increases in consumption out of their private assets early in retirement, in contrast to higher-decile retirees. A second, more subtle reason is that the frontloading that comes from using a slower-growing price index is not actuarially fair. To see why, note that the Frontloaded Reform allocates that total value of bene…ts through a uniform proportional adjustment to Status Quo bene…ts. Thus, it causes a redistribution of resources from low-mortality to high-mortality retirees, increasing the consumption of lower-income retirees. Note that this factor provides a second reason why consumption paths do not rise for higher-decile retirees under the Frontloaded Reform.
As for the second prominent feature of Figure 4 , consistent with prior research we …nd that most retirees exhaust their private assets only late into retirement, while a substantial share of lower-income retirees depend on Social Security bene…ts throughout much of retirement. Overall, only 18 percent of individuals exhaust their non-Social Security, non-DB assets in this simulation, also consistent with prior research. For example, Love, Palumbo, and Smith (2008) calculate "annualized comprehensive wealth," which is the value of a retiree's total resources divided by his or her remaining life expectancy at any given age. In their research they …nd that "in (real) dollar terms, the median household's...real annualized wealth actually tends to rise with age over retirement." In our simulations, we …nd consistent patterns, with annualized wealth calculated in this way greater …fteen years into retirement than at the start and positive until at least age 90 for retirees in the third income decile or higher. At the same time, lower income decile retirees exhaust their non-Social Security wealth much earlier. For the lowest decile, in these simulations non-Social Security wealth is nearly exhausted …fteen years into retirement and is less than the level of annual bene…ts only eight years in. The seeming dominance of Backloaded Reform is not airtight, however, because it generates losses for the poorest, shortest-lived retirees relative to Frontloaded Reform or the Status Quo. To examine this feature of the reforms, we calculate each individual's change in "realized retirement utility": the change in total utility during retirement for an individual from decile i who lives t years under each policy. We then convert these changes, which are in units of utility, into consumption equivalents by calculating the percentage change in the total present value of consumption during retirement that, when multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption in the last year of life for a retiree, yields the given change in realized retirement utility. Figure 5 shows the results. Reform (dash-dot line). Realized retirement utility for type i and age t is the total utility obtained in retirement for a retired household of income decile i who lives to the age t. Figure 5 shows the extent to which the seesaw apparent in bene…t paths translates into a similar shape in realized retirement utilities.
For all but the lowest decile of households, the Backloaded Reform generates higher realized utility than the Frontloaded Reform no matter the age of death, but especially at later ages when its ability to provide longevity insurance has its greatest value. The same preference holds for the poorest households who live beyond approximately age 82. In other words, most retirees sit squarely on the left end of the seesaw when it comes to these direct e¤ects of bene…ts-indexing reform, preferring a steeper path of bene…ts with a lower starting point. However, the poorest households who die earlier in retirement prefer Frontloaded Reform over Backloaded Reform, as shown in the top left subplot of Figure 5 . That is, they sit on the right end of the seesaw and prefer a ‡atter bene…t pro…le.
Now, we turn to a consideration of the Hybrid Progressive Reform in Figures 4 and 5. The
Hybrid Progressive Reform generates very di¤erent consumption e¤ects across deciles: while its path lies below the Status Quo at all ages for the top decile retiree, it exceeds all other paths at all ages for the bottom decile retiree. These di¤erences re ‡ect both its combination of the two other reforms and its extensive redistribution of bene…ts, as it can achieve wide-ranging improvements for low-income retirees at the cost of a general decrease in consumption for higher-income retirees. As would be expected, these implications for consumption translate into gains in realized retirement utility for every retiree in the bottom two (three, in fact) lifetime income deciles relative to the Status Quo and losses for every retiree in the top …ve deciles.
In the next section, I explore how we might convert these heterogeneous results across retiree households into net welfare implications.
Welfare criteria and net welfare implications of the direct e¤ects of reform
As summarized formally in expression (3), in this paper I calculate the net welfare e¤ects of reform by multiplying discounted changes in consumption from the Status Quo by two things: the population proportion of individuals who survive to enjoy that consumption, and a non-negative welfare weight g i;t . The weight g i;t measures the value society puts on a marginal increase in consumption for a household of type i at age t, relative to all other households. Because each reform has some retirees who gain and some who lose, their net welfare implications depend on how those welfare weights vary across the population of retirees.
Two familiar principles
The conventional approach to normative evaluation in much of applied public economics research is to rely on well-known principles with roots in political philosophy, the two most commonly-used being the simple-sum utilitarian criterion and the so-called "Rawlsian," or maximin criterion. 16 These two criteria have especially clear implications for the welfare weights g i;t , and it turns out that the choice between them illustrates well the policymaking challenge that bene…ts-indexing reform presents.
Under the simple-sum utilitarian criterion, the change in welfare dW is the sum of the experienced annual utility changes across all individuals. In the language of the general formula (3) above, this option sets g i;t = u 0 (c i;t ), so that society puts greater weight on the annual consumption changes of individuals with lower consumption levels (and thus higher marginal utilities of consumption). Figure 6 shows the g i;t for the same four deciles as in previous …gures, given the consumption levels in the simulated Status Quo economy from the previous section and scaled so that the maximum g i;t equals one. Marginal welfare weights g i;t for four of the ten deciles of retirees under the Utilitarian criterion, where g i;t equals the marginal utility from consumption at age t for a retiree of type i. Figure 6 all have the same scale, making it clear that the utilitarian criterion puts much greater weight on consumption changes for lower-income retirees than others, and in particular on consumption changes at advanced ages for those households, when their consumption levels fall to the level of their Social Security bene…ts. Note that these di¤erences are especially large given our assumption (following SSK) that = 3, a value that is toward the upper end of conventional ranges for that parameter. If we use = 1:5, the marginal weights on the …fth decile rise to around 0.20.
The vertical axes in
The Rawlsian criterion prioritizes the well-being of the worst-o¤ member of society. It therefore sets g i;t = 1:00 on the consumption change of the household in the lowest income decile who lives only one year in retirement-i.e., the household with the lowest overall utility in retirement-and g i;t = 0:00 on all other consumption changes. 17 The net welfare implications of each bene…ts-indexing alternative under the Rawlsian criterion are immediately apparent from examining Figure 5 As this result implies, the extent of backloading most preferred under the utilitarian criterion may be substantially larger than that implied by a switch to the CPI-E. If we solve for the utilitarianoptimal and (i.e., for the class of reforms formalized in expression 1), we …nd that = 0:012 (about three times the rate increase from the switch to the CPI-E) and = 0:91 maximize total expected utility of all retirees at retirement (we cannot use the marginal welfare weights approach in this case because the changes are too large).
The contrast between the Rawlsian and utilitarian rankings suggests that there may exist a mixture of the two that would be consistent with the Status Quo policy being chosen as optimal.
In fact, if we put a weight of 0.91 on the Rawlsian weights and 0.09 on the utilitarian weights, the planner prefers the Status Quo policy to both the backloaded and frontloaded reforms. 18 The large implied weight on the Rawlsian weights in the Status Quo makes sense in light of the …nding that backloading is preferred by most agents. That is, for the Status Quo policy to be optimal the 1 7 The Rawlsian priority as modeled here is an extreme case of a social objective in which weights on individuals decrease in their lifetime, rather than annual, utility-see Pestieau and Ponthiere (2012) and the comments on this paper by Aleh Tsyvinski for discussions. A related pattern for MSWWs (in this paper's framework) weights consumption changes by the retiree's total utility in retirement raised to a negative exponent (e.g., as if we were taking the marginal utility of total consumption in retirement). Such weights can generate a preference for frontloading if the curvature over total retirement utility is steep enough, because the weights in that case approach Rawlsian weights. For less steep curvature, backloading is still preferred. 1 8 Thanks to Aleh Tsyvinski for suggesting this analysis.
planner must have a large weight on the worst-o¤ retiree.
The Hybrid Progressive Reform, however, is the most-preferred of these policies under both the utilitarian and Rawlsian criteria. By combining the two other reforms'positive implications for the poorest retirees, the Hybrid Progressive Reform outperforms them both. That is, the frontloading in the early years of the proposal bene…ts the worst-o¤ retirees, increasing its appeal under the Rawlsian criterion, while the backloading through the bene…t enhancements brings utilitarian gains.
Both of these bene…ts are substantially augmented by the redistribution pursued under this reform, while the corresponding negative e¤ects on the top half of retirees are given, under both criteria, very little weight. We can quantify the potential gain from this reform under the utilitarian criterion by calculating the uniform proportional increase in consumption across all retiree types and ages that would generate the same increase in social welfare as does this reform over the Status Quo. That Of course, these conventional criteria may not match true social preferences, and to explore this possibility we now turn to an attempt to empirically study society's normative priorities for Social Security.
Evidence on prevailing normative priorities for Social Security
This section presents some novel survey evidence on the American public's priorities for Social Security generated through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) interface. The way in which this survey elicits marginal social welfare weights g i;t may prove useful to other researchers interested in using a positive approach to normative questions. 19 The survey was completed in August, 2014 by 150 members of the Amazon Mechanical Turk worker population from the United States who demonstrated good past performance on tasks.
Respondents had up to 15 minutes to complete the survey, and they were asked to enter their M-Turk identi…cation number as well as a completion code at the end of the survey for veri…cation purposes. The respondents completed the survey in less than seven minutes on average. They were paid $2.50 for the task, for an average hourly rate of $23.00.
Mechanical Turk is of course an imperfect tool: e.g., it is not a representative sample of Americans. That said, it has proven to be a popular alternative to surveys costing orders of magnitude more (with their own problems with representativeness), and analysis by subgroup can provide some reassurance on the robustness of the results to sample composition. Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser (2010) study the use of Mechanical Turk, and …nd: "Online experiments, we show, can be 1 9 A growing literature in public economic theory has considered using positive evidence on prevailing normative priorities, rather than exogenously speci…ed normative criteria, to inform evaluations of policy. See Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) for an overview of "empirical social choice" research. Weinzierl (2014) and Saez and Stantcheva (2014) are recent examples applied to tax policy. just as valid-both internally and externally-as laboratory and …eld experiments, while often requiring far less money and time to design and conduct."
The survey has three parts. The …rst part tests whether respondents understand and can perform simple calculations related to the concepts of percentages, averages, and life expectancy.
The third part of the survey asks respondents to self-report their political views and demographic traits (age, gender, education, and economic status).
I gather data on normative priorities for Social Security in the second part of the survey.
Respondents are given a one-sentence (o¢ cial) description of Social Security, told that policymakers must decide (among other things) how much in bene…ts to pay out to di¤erent retirees, and then told they will be asked a couple of questions to get their "opinions on how policymakers should make this choice." They are then shown the following screen:
The three retirees in this …rst question represent three important points in the joint age-income distribution. 20 In particular, John represents a very low income individual with a short life expectancy, the point given particular priority by the Rawlsian criterion. William is also very low income but has lived a long life, giving him a greater overall utility level than John but leaving him with a smaller current (according to the survey) level of consumption. Thus a Utilitarian would allocate more to William, while a Rawlsian would allocate more to John. Finally, Robert is a middle-income individual approaching his expected lifespan. He is much better o¤ than either of the other retirees and provides a simple way for us to gauge how quickly marginal welfare weights decline with well-being. 21 This …rst question is largely intended to get respondents to engage with the descriptions of these retirees. Nevertheless, the responses may be of interest. William is rated …rst by 62% the respondents, John by 29%, and Robert by 9%. The preference for William directly casts some doubt on the possibility that a Rawlsian criterion will emerge from the survey evidence.
The key questions for this paper's purposes comes next, when respondents are shown a series of screens starting with one like the following, tailored according to which retiree the respondent ranked last in the previous question. In this screen, the respondent ranked Robert last in that question.
If the respondent chooses Robert over John in this question, he or she is reminded (by the computer) that Robert was ranked last in the earlier question, and he or she is asked to make the choices consistent. Then, the following choice appears:
If the respondent chooses John over Robert, he or she then faces the same choice but with the increase for John at $50 and then $25. After that, or whenever the respondent chooses Robert over John, he or she then faces a similar set of choices between bene…ts increases for Robert and William.
These series of questions are designed to allow the direct inference of marginal welfare weights. 22 To see how, suppose a respondent ranks Robert last and (implicitly) assigns marginal value g Robert to Robert's consumption. Then, an $100 increase in Robert's bene…ts provides a bene…t to the respondent (acting as a policymaker) of 100g Robert . The respondent is then asked to choose between this gain and alternative gains. Suppose the respondent chooses the $50 increase for William (but not the $25 increase) over the $100 increase for Robert. Then, we can infer that 100g Robert > 25g W illiam and 100g Robert < 50g W illiam implying that g Robert =g W illiam 2 [0:25; 0:5] : Similarly, we can calculate a range for g Robert =g John for each respondent, indicating the pro…le of relative welfare weights across these retirees.
Components of these questions are designed to counteract some potential confounding in ‡uences on the respondents. I ask respondents to "ignore any e¤ects these options might have on the rest of the economy, and focus on the e¤ect each option has on the corresponding retiree." This request is intended in particular to minimize the extent to which respondents consider the e¢ ciency costs of raising di¤erent amounts of extra revenue for the bene…ts increases. I also ask them to "imagine that you are a policymaker" in the hopes that it will cause the respondents to take a considered, objective perspective. Inconsistent answers across the ranking question and the series of choices cause error messages to appear, preventing the respondent from making errors in interpreting the questions. Finally, the wide range of potential relative valuations implied by the choices (from 1:3 to 4:0 in each case) is intended to reduce concerns that respondents would default to equality and thereby imply smaller di¤erences between g weights than is accurate, as might be natural in other designs (such as splitting an amount between the retirees).
A number of potential risks remain with survey evidence of this kind. One risk is that respondents may not be accustomed to thinking about these policy choices in terms of indi¤erence points, which seem natural to most economists but which reverse the intuitive idea that the respondent would like to grant his or her preferred retirees greater increases, not smaller ones, than his or her least preferred retiree. Of course, more general concerns about how the questions are framed and whether the survey primes respondents toward any particular outcome also apply to this speci…c One possibility suggested by these results is that respondents'moral reasoning re ‡ects a mixture of these two standard criteria, Such a mix can easily generate g i;t values for t = 1 and t = 35 for the lowest income decile i = 1 that are very similar, in keeping with the survey evidence on John and William. The same mix yields extremely small values for the welfare weight on the "average" retiree (i.e., i = 5 and T = 10), in keeping with the survey evidence on Robert.
When we apply these weights to the reform options, the rankings and consumption-equivalent welfare gains and losses are the same for all reform proposals as under the utilitarian criterion.
The costs of the Backloaded Reform for the worst-o¤ retirees are not enough to o¤set the gains it generates for the poor retirees who outlive their private assets, so backloaded bene…ts as under a switch to the CPI-E are preferred to frontloaded bene…ts as under a switch to the chained CPI-U.
The Hybrid Progressive Reform, by combining the Backloaded Reform's appeal to long-lived poor retirees with the Frontloaded Reform's appeal to the short-lived poor retirees, dominates the policy ranking under this criterion, re ‡ecting survey respondents'low concern for consumption decreases among better-o¤ retirees.
Extensions to the baseline analysis
In this section, I extend the analysis above along a number of dimensions. Though each extension modi…es the baseline results somewhat, the basic seesaw metaphor, the tradeo¤ between the e¤ects on the vast majority of retiree households and the worst-o¤, and the likely net welfare impacts of the direct e¤ects of bene…ts-indexing reform all continue to apply. To simplify the discussion, I
focus on the e¤ects of these extensions on the Backloaded and Frontloaded Reform policies.
Myopic households
The fully rational, foresighted utility maximizing household modeled above may not represent all, or even most, retirees'consumption and saving behavior. In particular, though the evidence reviewed in Section 1 suggests that myopia is not an issue for most retirees outside of the lowest income deciles, we might be interested in the e¤ects of assuming that some share of retirees have di¢ culty delaying consumption early in retirement. Feldstein (1985 Feldstein ( , 1987 made clear the importance of myopic households to determining the optimal path of bene…ts.
To gauge the e¤ects of this myopia, I consider a model in which retirees from the bottom through sixth income deciles choose consumption at each age using a lower discount factor^ than the true discount factor upon which their utility depends, as in Table 6:   Table 6 : Impatience by income decile and few initial assets. For example, the shortest-lived household in the bottom decile has more than twice the gain from frontloading in this setting as in the baseline. Moreover, the shorter-lived half of households in the second income decile now gain from Frontloaded Reform (whereas they lost in the baseline case), as their impatience causes them to bene…t more from the higher initial bene…ts and their limited assets make the appeal of backloading small. Their (impatient) consumption of an even higher share of the frontloaded bene…ts means that, when they (ex post) do not survive later into retirement, their realized utility during retirement was even higher than in the patient case.
On balance, under the utilitarian criterion the increase in the gains to the majority of households outweighs the increase in the losses to a few, such that the net welfare impacts of the direct e¤ects on retirees are more positive for backloading and more negative for frontloading in this model than in the baseline case. Similarly, the di¤erence between the two policies under the Rawlsian criterion, which ranks the frontloading policy ahead of the backloading policy, also grows.
Budget non-neutrality
Thus far I have imposed budget neutrality to disentangle the e¤ects of changing the shape of the time-path of bene…ts from the e¤ects of changing the expected present-value of those bene…ts. Of course, much of the energy in the policy debate over bene…ts-indexing is due to the likelihood that choosing a more slowly-growing price index, such as the chained CPI-U, would generate savings for the Social Security program.
The approach taken above can readily include a requirement that reform lower the expected present-value cost of bene…ts. To illustrate this, I reduce all Status Quo bene…ts by 10 percent and impose the same restriction on reform policies as before, namely that they have the same expected present value total cost of bene…ts. The baseline results change very little with this variation, with the same households lining up on either end of the seesaw as in the baseline case and the same net welfare implications obtaining. The intuition for these results is that the relative e¤ects of the reforms are largely una¤ected by the shift in their total value. Once all are adjusted to provide 10 percent smaller total bene…ts, the backloaded reform continues to provide better longevity risk protection than the modi…ed Status Quo or frontloaded reform, while the poorest, shortest-lived retirees continue to prefer the frontloaded reform that provides greater bene…ts early on. These results support the argument that analyses of the level and shape of bene…ts may be done separately.
Non-constant Status Quo bene…ts
Second, thus far I have assumed that Status Quo bene…ts are constant in real terms. In reality, there is considerable debate and uncertainty over whether they are increasing or decreasing in real terms. Goda et al. (2007) argue that current bene…ts-indexing, and even the faster-growing CPI-E, fail to provide enough protection against the rising costs of medical expenditure among retirees as they age and over time. Speci…cally, they calculate the real Social Security bene…t net of medical expenses and show that it grew more slowly from 1983 to 2007 than did a price index of non-medical goods and services (so the real non-medical purchasing power of Social Security bene…ciaries declined). On the other hand, …xed-basket price indices such as the CPI-W are susceptible to the well-known problem that they overestimate the in ‡ation faced by individuals due to quality changes and substitution away from expensive goods and services (see Boskin et al, 1996) .
To test the sensitivity of our baseline results to this assumption, I consider two alternatives.
First, to study the possibility that the CPI-W underestimates the in ‡ation faced by retirees, I
assume that the CPI-E is, in fact, the correct price index for retirees. This means that Backloaded
Reform now has = 0:00, and I set its = 1:00 to impose budget neutrality as in the baseline case. Though the bene…ts paths in Figure 7 look quite di¤erent from those in Figure 3 , the relative e¤ects of reform on households are remarkably similar in this variation on the baseline analysis.
Essentially the same households bene…t from Backloaded Reform and Frontloaded Reform, and to very similar degrees. The results on the net welfare implications of reform are very similar, as well, under either the utilitarian or Rawlsian criterion.
Second, to study the possibility that the CPI-W overestimates the in ‡ation faced by retirees, I assume that the chained CPI-U is, in fact, the correct price index for retirees. This means that
Frontloaded Reform now has = 0:00, and I set its = 1:00, the Status Quo now has = +0:0027 and = 0:978, while Backloaded Reform has = +0:0064 and = 0:947. The baseline results are robust to this variation, as well.
Bequest motive
The retirees in the baseline model have no reason to retain wealth other than longevity risk. In much of the existing literature explaining retiree wealth dynamics, a bequest motive is used as an ingredient to explain the retention of substantial assets late into retirement. As noted earlier, the simulations in this paper generate paths for what Love et al. (2008) call "annualized comprehensive wealth," that …t well with what appears in the data. Nevertheless, it may be valuable to understand the robustness of our results to the existence of a bequest motive, given its prominence in previous, more sophisticated, simulations of retiree behavior.
To test this, I have households value any assets left at death as if those assets were consumed by their heirs in the next period, multiplied by a factor scaling the strength of their bequest motive, using the same utility function speci…cation (4) as for the household while it was alive. That parameter, is: Table 7 : Bequest motive by income decile Of course, the non-surviving household leaves assets unspent in the Frontloaded policy, and if those assets were reclaimed by the government, the di¤erence between the policies would diminish.
In reality, the U.S. government raises very little revenue from the taxation of bequests, and none from households for which Social Security bene…ts materially change their accumulation of assets, so I assume that the direct …scal costs of bene…ts is not o¤set by any posthumous taxation. Similarly, I do not consider the value inheritors place on bequests, a topic analyzed in Feldstein (1990) , to retain this paper's focus on the direct e¤ects of reform on retirees.
Additional transfers
Throughout the analysis I abstract from additional transfers made to poor retirees. In reality, the Reform. That is, the Backloaded Reform can produce a Pareto improvement in this case relative to the Status Quo. Another, simpler scenario is that such transfers would also be adjusted in any reform to bene…ts-indexing, so that the net e¤ect on bene…ciaries of a reform to Social Security bene…ts-indexing may be only partially o¤set, not o¤set at all, or even magni…ed. Because of this ambiguity, and the likelihood that including such transfer programs in the analysis would strengthen the results of the baseline, I chose to omit them from the main paper. Of course a more comprehensive analysis that included a range of potential changes to these transfer programs would be valuable.
Finally, note that our omission of these transfers causes the marginal utility values of consumption for individuals in the lowest income decile to be larger than if these transfers were included.
This factor will cause the baseline analysis to overestimate the appeal of frontloaded reform and underestimate the appeal of backloaded reform.
Discussion and Conclusion
The choice of a price index for Social Security bene…ts may seem to have, for most purposes, small stakes. One exception, however, is its implications for retirees who rely on Social Security bene…ts to fund their consumption either because their own resources are limited or they outlive their expected lifespan. For these retirees, half of a percentage point faster growth in bene…ts-approximately the di¤erence between two of the most prominent proposals for indexing reform-turns into a 20 percent increase in bene…ts if they outlive their private savings. On the other hand, assuming budget-neutral reform, it also can mean bene…ts that are 7 percent lower at the start of retirement, when they are sure to be alive to receive them.
In this paper, I outline a ‡exible and relatively simple formal structure for modeling this tradeo¤ in the direct e¤ects of bene…ts-indexing reform on a population of heterogeneous retiree households.
I bring to that model evidence from recent empirical work on Social Security, quantifying the e¤ects of three prominent policy proposals. I gather some new evidence on the priorities Americans appear to have for Social Security bene…ts, using a methodology that may prove useful more broadly. Finally, using that evidence, as well as conventional normative criteria, I provide suggestive estimates of those proposals'e¤ects in terms of social welfare.
The results of this analysis suggest that reform to a backloaded bene…ts-indexing approach, such as the CPI-E, has substantial appeal, at least in terms of its direct e¤ects on retirees. Note that this is, of course, the opposite proposal to the one that has generated the most enthusiasm in Washington: namely, a switch to the slower-growing chained CPI-U. A backloaded approach's ability to concentrate resources at later ages, when retirees face longevity risk and have exhausted their own resources, makes it the preferred approach for most retirees. While a normative criterion that concentrates priority on the worst-o¤ retirees would therefore endorse a frontloaded reform, the standard utilitarian criterion and the criterion implied by the survey evidence in this paper prefer to backload the path of bene…ts.
Political considerations make the case for backloaded bene…ts-indexing reform extremely di¢ -cult, however. Such a reform would require a reduction in initial bene…ts to retain budget neutrality or an increase in total spending on bene…ts to retain initial bene…t levels. Both requirements are likely to be deal-killers in Washington.
In this context, the appeal of President Obama's 2014 budget proposal for a bene…ts-indexing reform that combines a shift to the chained CPI-U with bene…t enhancements at advanced ages becomes clear. Such a proposal can capture the best parts of both of the simpler reforms-protecting both the poorest, shortest-lived retirees who would prefer frontloading and the large majority of retirees, especially those who live to advanced ages, who prefer backloading. It is important to note that the President's speci…c proposal combined this hybrid of frontloading and backloading with an increase in progressivity, which might be achieved through other means, as the bene…t enhancements at advanced ages were to be uniform across the lifetime-income distribution. In the simulations above it causes the top …ve income deciles of retirees to prefer the Status Quo to this reform, and the potential disincentive e¤ects from which this paper abstracts may therefore reduce this proposal's appeal. Nevertheless, if those disincentive e¤ects are limited and the normative preferences of Americans resemble those of either the conventional utilitarian criterion or those implied by the survey results in this paper, the Hybrid Progressive Reform is likely to generate-in terms of the direct e¤ects on retirees-a sizeable net welfare gain.
As this result and the rest of the analysis in this paper has demonstrated, bene…ts-indexing reform is more than just a …scal issue; its distributional implications and its possible role as a vehicle for redistribution make it a ‡exible and potentially powerful policy tool. Given that, it is important to reiterate that this paper uses a simpli…ed model that abstracts from a number of e¤ects of shifting the time-path of bene…ts on household behavior and the general economic environment, as well as from complexities of the Social Security system and retiree household structure. My hope is that it puts that simplicity to good use, clarifying a piece of the tradeo¤s involved in choosing a
